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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Adriel Ayon Nunez appeals from the judgment dismissing his successive 
post-conviction petition. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In 2003, Nunez was convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine and the 
district court imposed a unified 25-year sentence with 15 years fixed. (See R., 
p. 71.) The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on October 19, 2004. (See 
id.) 
Nunez filed his first post-conviction petition on July 18, 2005, raising 
numerous issues. (See R., p.72.) The district court summarily dismissed some 
of the claims and dismissed the remaining claims following an evidentiary 
hearing. (See R., p.73.) The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-
conviction relief in an opinion issued on January 4, 2008, and the Idaho Supreme 
Court denied Nunez's petition for review on March 24, 2008. (See id. at pp.73-
74) 
On August 3, 2011, Nunez filed "A Verified Motion for Telephonic Hearing 
with Notice in Re: U.N. Treaty Violations" (hereafter "Motion"), in which he 
appears to request an end to "racial discrimination." (R., pp.6-11, 18-19, 33.) In 
this same pleading, Nunez also notes he received a letter from the State 
Appellate Public Defender "showing that there is Brady material that needs to be 
developed before the court." (R., p.12.) The letter, dated June 13, 2011, which 
is attached to Nunez's pleading, is addressed to Nunez and advises, in part: 
1 
You are receiving this letter because our records indicate 
that after January 1, 2003, the State Appellate Public Defender was 
appointed to represent you in an appeal from a conviction involving 
either controlled substances or driving while under the influence. 
The State Appellate Public Defender has recently received 
information which may have affected your case. Enclosed you will 
find copies of three memorandums sent out by the Idaho State 
Police which indicate that as early as 2003, certain improprieties 
occurred in at least one of the state's forensic laboratories. 
Please note, the State Appellate Public Defender has not 
determined whether the information contained herein actually 
affected your case. Rather, we are notifying you of this information 
so you may review it, consider whether to investigate the issue 
further, and determine whether you wish to pursue any post-
conviction challenges to your conviction. 
(R., p.44.) 
Nunez's Motion also appears to raise claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
(R., pp.14-15, 25), lack of jurisdiction over his criminal case (R., pp.20-24, 26-27, 
31 ), perjury by a witness at trial and subornation of perjury (R., pp.24-25, 32), 
and error in the jury instructions (R., pp.29-32). Nunez also requested the 
appointment of counsel "in the limited capacity of Subpoenas' [sic] & Marshaling 
the Witnesses." (R., p.34 (capitalization original).) 
The court treated Nunez's Motion as a successive post-conviction 
petition, 1 appointed the public defender's office, and scheduled a pretrial 
conference for November 21, 2011, and an evidentiary hearing for December 19, 
2011. (R., pp.65-66; see R., p.71.) The court subsequently entered a Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss Successive Post-Conviction Petition ("Notice"), notifying Nunez 
1 Nunez did not object to the court characterizing his Motion as a post-conviction 
petition; indeed, in the "Relief Sought" section of his Motion, Nunez asked the 
court to consider the "claims presented, via whatever means it deems capable of 
granting relief, not inconsistent with that allowed under I.C. § 19-4901 (7)" (R., 
p.34), which is a provision within the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. 
2 
of its intent to dismiss his claims. (R., pp.71-81.) The court found the majority of 
Nunez's claims barred by I.C. § 19-4908 as well as time-barred. (R., p.80.) With 
respect to Nunez's allegation regarding the state lab, the court found the claim 
was timely given the date of the discovery of the alleged improprieties at the lab, 
but notified Nunez it intended to dismiss the claim because Nunez "failed to 
allege facts to show that the lab's testing in his case was inaccurate." (R., p.79 
(emphasis original).) 
In response to the court's orders, Nunez (1) filed an objection to the 
appointment of counsel in any capacity other than what he "expressly defined" in 
relation to his request for counsel; (2) complained that he did not receive a copy 
of the court's "aggressive pretrial/scheduling order," which resulted in a "lack of 
zest" in his "breakfast eggs"; (3) "reserv[ed] the right to raise Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel on [his] prior post-conviction, appeal, trial & pretrial 
counsel"; and (4) asked to "proceed under the original jurisdiction of the District 
Court and or to be given 'Permission' to proceed into the Idaho Supreme Court." 
(R., pp.83-90 (capitalization original).) More specifically with respect to the 
court's order appointing counsel, Nunez "ask[ed] to exercise his equal protection 
rights to proceed pro se and set[ ] his objection to the court[ ] acting outside its 
discretion by preventing him from doing so" and asked the court to order "the 
appointed 'Standby Counsel' ... not to interfere with [Nunez's] control of the 
defense." (R., p.89 (capitalization original).) 
The court issued a Second Notice of Intent to Dismiss Successive Post-
Conviction Petition ("Second Notice") for the purpose of "reissu[ing]" its Notice to 
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Nunez "himself and to his appointed counsel" and provided the "time for objection 
[would] be renewed from the date of' the Second Notice. (R., p.100.) The 
Second Notice was otherwise the same as the original Notice. (Compare R., 
pp.71-81 with pp.100-11.) 
Presumably in response to the Second Notice, Nunez filed a "Notice of 
Error, Objection and Request for Relief' (hereafter "Objection"). (R., pp.117-
155.) In his Objection, Nunez complained that he requested, through "standby 
counsel," the '"Certificate of Lab Testing' in the underlying criminal case," but had 
not yet received it. (R., p.122 (emphasis omitted).) Nunez also complained that 
the state was sending information to standby counsel rather than directly to him. 
(R., p.122.) Regarding the merits of his claim relating to the state lab, Nunez 
asserted: 
Th[e] evidence supports the conclusion that David C. 
Sincerbeaux was active in [his] case on 07/16/02. Th[e] evidence 
also establishes the fact that the EVIDENCE DESCRIPTION AND 
CONCLUSION was unreasonably different than that of the third test 
done by Heather Campbell. Because Criminalist Sincerbeaux 
documented the weight of Package #6 at 448.28g, used 0.05g for 
testing, leaving 448.25g documented. That is not consistent with 
Forensic Scientist II, Heather Campbell's documentation of the 
EVIDENCE DESCRIPTION AND CONCLUSION[.] 
Because Heather Campbell documented the Package #6 ( on 
receipt) as Exhibit 1 R.6 (6) with 448.1g on receipt and before 
testing used 0.1 g leaving 448.g after test. Her documentation show 
variance in every package. 
(R., pp.123-24 (brackets added, otherwise verbatim).) 
Nunez further claimed the "evidence . . . shows that David C. 
Sincerbeaux, more likely than not, (by a preponderance of the evidence) acted 
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consistently with conduct uncovered in Detective JM Donahue's 02-24-11 
investigation." (R., p.125.) According to Nunez, "under the circumstances 
established by newly developed evidence, the lab test results entered into 
evidence are inadmissible. The introduction of the best evidence would have 
proven that the package tested negative, and did not consist of any controlled 
substances. Whereby, the verdict of not guilt [sic] would have resulted." (R., 
p.126 (verbatim).) In support of his assertions, Nunez submitted the Idaho State 
Police Office of Professional Standards, Administrative Investigation Report, 
OPS Case Number OP 2011-003, prepared by Detective JM Donahue. (R., 
pp.137-155.) In his Objection, Nunez also requested the "Original Certificate of 
Lab Testing," "copies of any supplemental investigations done by Idaho State 
Police ... [in] OPS Case Number OP 2011-003," and "any newly developed 
Investigatory Reports" relating to '"The Administrative Investigation Report of 
February 24, 2011, by Detective JM Donahue"' (R., pp.126, 128 (capitalization 
original).) Nunez also requested the "continued assignment of Standby Counsel, 
and compliance with practices, including research of law relative to applicants 
[sic] claims." (R., p.130.) 
On October 12, 2011, presumably in response to Nunez's Objection, the 
court ordered the state to 
deliver directly to the plaintiff, Mr. Adriel Ayon Nunez, a full and 
complete copy of any documents relating to lab testing performed 
by the Idaho State Police Forensic Service in the plaintiffs 
underlying criminal case, including the "Original Certification of Lab 
Test Results," as requested in the plaintiff's "Notice of Error, 
Objection and Request for Relief', [sic] filed on October 6, 2011. 
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(R., p.197.) The court's order further provided that if any of the "documents 
cannot be produced, a sworn affidavit shall be presented to the plaintiff, his 
standby counsel and th[e] Court as to the reasons therefore." (R., p.198.) The 
state was ordered to deliver the documents by November 4, 2011, "with copies 
sent to the plaintiff, Twin Falls County Public Defender, and th[e] Court for filing." 
(R., pp.198-99.) The state complied with the court's order on October 14, 2011.2 
(R., pp.200-06.) Nunez then filed an affidavit in which he indicated that, "[a]s a 
result of phone communications with [standby counsel] on ... 9-29-11," he 
identified certain "facts and admissible evidence" to support his claim related to 
the state lab, which he set forth in the affidavit. (R., pp.209-212.) The crux of 
Nunez's allegation was that the evidence "ha[d] undergone an impermissible 
variance in weight," for which there was no explanation. (R., pp.211-212; see 
also R., pp.253-278, 281-284, 297-304 (subsequent prose pleadings describing 
nature of claim).) At the conclusion of his affidavit, Nunez reminded the court he 
was not "waiving [his] rights to proceed prose." (R., p.212.) 
On October 26, 2011, the state filed a response to Nunez's allegation "that 
there was a variance in the weights of the methamphetamine between the testing 
by Sincerbaux and Campbell," asserting any such discrepancy was "known or 
should have been known at the time of [Nunez's] first petition for post conviction 
relief," as illustrated by the trial transcript. (R., pp.226-236.) Nevertheless, on 
November 1, 2011, the court entered an order stating, in part: 
2 The state filed a supplemental discovery response on November 17, 2011. (R., 
p.305.) 
6 
Having reviewed the Plaintiffs filings, the Court finds that 
there is a question of fact warranting an evidentiary hearing 
concerning the claim of improper drug testing which could entitle 
Plaintiff to some relief. It is extremely difficult to ascertain precisely 
what the Plaintiff is alleging. To avoid the possibility of error (i.e. a 
finding by any appellate court that there are issues of fact 
warranting an evidentiary hearing) the Court will grant Mr. Nunez 
an evidentiary hearing solely on the issue of improper drug testing. 
However, the balance of the claims in the petition must be 
dismissed for the reasons set forth in the Court's Second Notice. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all of 
Plaintiff's Petition, save the issue of improper drug testing, is 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The evidentiary hearing 
scheduled for December 19, 2011 at 1 :30 P.M. shall be limited to 
the claimed improper drug testing issue. It is Further Ordered that 
this evidentiary hearing will be bifurcated to permit the State to 
meet any evidence submitted by Plaintiff at the hearing. 
Scheduling of the State's presentation of evidence, if any, will be 
determined following the presentation of Plaintiffs case. 
Based upon Plaintiff's continuous assertions that he is 
representing himself in this matter, the obligation of the Twin Falls 
Public Defender shall be limited to providing "stand-by" counsel 
services. 
(R., p.240 (capitalization original).) 
On November 9, 2011, Nunez filed another pro se pleading entitled 
"Petitioners [sic] Reply to State's 10/24/11 Responsive Pleading." (R., p.297.) In 
that document, Nunez again described his position regarding the testing 
conducted by the state lab in his underlying criminal case and, at the conclusion 
of that pleading, Nunez wrote: "Premises considered, the petitioner shall 
withdraw his pro se status at this time, in aid of Counsel's timely preparation for 
the hearing and ever cognizant of the stress and strains such efforts require." 
(R., p.303 (verbatim).) Nunez further stated: "The Office of the Public Defender 
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is urged to consider the premises, create the witness list and issue subpeona's 
now, in time for the proceedings. (R., p.304 (verbatim).) 
The court conducted a pre-trial conference on November 21, 2011, at 
which the court noted it had received a transport order for the conference but 
was unable to execute it in time to have Nunez transported. (Tr., p.4, Ls.18-20.) 
Standby post-conviction counsel, who was present, advised the court that she 
sent over the transport order "upon receiving some documents from [Nunez]," 
which she "tender[ed] to the court ... for filing."3 (Tr., p.5, Ls.4-6.) Counsel 
noted that, upon reviewing those documents, "it became clear to [her] that Mr. 
Nunez basically consider[ed] himself to be representing himself prose." (Tr., p.5, 
Ls.17-19.) Counsel asked whether, "in light of that," it would be "appropriate to 
continue th[e] ... hearing since [Nunez] view[ed] [her] as not empowered to 
represent him." (Tr., p.5, Ls.19-22.) 
In response to standby counsel's concerns, the court stated the "only 
issue ... for th[e] pretrial conference is the scope of th[e] [evidentiary] hearing." 
(Tr., p.6, Ls.22-23; see also p.6, Ls.11-13.) The court also commented that it 
was "not sure that [Nunez] has sufficient evidence to move forward with that 
claim," which is why the court arranged for a "bifurcated hearing" so that it could 
first determine whether Nunez could make a "prima facie case." (Tr., p.7, Ls.4-
18.) Other than taking judicial notice of Heather Campbell's trial testimony, as 
3 Upon receiving those documents, the court stated: "Well, I guess we'll file this 
in the court file. It looks very duplicative of what we already have." (Tr., p.6, 
Ls.6-8.) 
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requested by the parties, no other substantive matters were undertaken at the 
pretrial conference. (See generally Tr., pp.4-8.) 
Ten days later, and 18 days before the evidentiary hearing, Nunez filed a 
motion requesting the appointment of counsel stating he needed counsel to 
"formulate a proposed witness list, draft & submit supeona's [sic], gather & 
submit relevant evidence." (R., pp.308-310.) At the December 19, 2011 
evidentiary hearing, the court asked Nunez whether he was prepared to present 
evidence. (Tr., p.11, Ls.4-5.) Nunez responded: "I need to talk to you, Judge .. 
.. I asked for an attorney and I sent a letter so that she could represent me." 
(Tr., p.11, Ls.10-13.) The court acknowledged Nunez recently filed a motion 
requesting the appointment of counsel, but noted it was never "noticed for 
hearing." (Tr., p.11, L.14 - p.12, L.1.) The court then asked: "Mr. Nunez, why 
should I appoint you counsel at this late date when you have told me for months 
now that you wish to represent yourself in this case?" (Tr., p.12, Ls.2-4.) 
Nunez explained that he was "defending [himself] because [he] wasn't 
able to communicate with [counsel]," but he sent counsel "copies of [his] 
documents so that way she could help [him] [there]." (Tr., p.12, Ls.15-18.) The 
court advised Nunez that it was "clear to [it] that" Nunez "wanted to represent 
himself ... and ha[d] done so from the outset." (Tr., p.12, Ls.20-22.) The court 
asked standby counsel whether she had a different understanding regarding the 
scope of her representation and she stated she did not, noting Nunez's 
"communications to [her] have been that he wanted to represent himself' 
although "he may be having additional thoughts about it." (Tr., p.13, Ls.2-5.) 
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In addressing Nunez's request for counsel, the court stated: 
[O]ne of the decisions I have to make in these kind of cases, at 
least as I understand the appellate rulings, is to make a decision 
with regard to the appointment of counsel before we even move 
forward here. One of the factors that I look at is whether there's 
any basis to this petition. Frankly, I can't figure out what the basis 
to this petition is. I have erred on the side of caution to give Mr. 
Nunez an opportunity to come in here and present whatever 
evidence he has in support of his petition today. 
(Tr., p.13, Ls.7-17.) The court then asked standby counsel whether Nunez had 
any evidence he intended to present that day. (Tr., p.13, Ls.18-21.) Standby 
counsel responded: "Your Honor, I think that Mr. Nunez is going to be asking the 
court to take judicial notice of the attachments to four of his filings and requesting 
that the court consider those as evidence." (Tr., p.13, Ls.22-25.) Counsel then 
identified those documents as follows: (1) "the Affidavit of Facts in Regards to 
Errors Surrounding the Testing by Idaho State Police Forensic Services," filed 
October 18, 2011; (2) "Notice of Continued Brady Error in the Cumulative, and 
Within the Prosecution's Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery," filed 
November 9, 2011; (3) "Notice of Continued Brady Error in the Cumulation, and 
Within the Prosecution's Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery, 
Affidavit of Fact [sic] in Support," filed November 9, 2011; and (4) "Notice of 
Continued Brady Error in the Cumulative, and Within the Prosecution's 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery, Memorandum of Law in 
Support," filed November 9, 2011.4 (Tr., p.14, L.6 - p.15, L.2.) 
4 Although counsel stated the pleadings were filed November 21, 2011, the court 
disagreed, noting the documents were actually filed November 9; 2011. (Tr., 
p.15, Ls.3-22.) 
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Nunez himself then explained he wanted the court to consider the 
documents he submitted "because of David Sincerbeaux." (Tr., p.17, L.25 -
p.18, L.1.) Nunez argued: 
[Sincerbeaux] was in charge or under investigation in the 
laboratory, that the drugs that they did present there are not the 
ones that I supposedly had. They are not the same. I don't know. 
They are not them. There is not a legal paper that says that they 
were drugs. I was asking for the results of those drugs that were 
tested and I never received them. They presented the case, but 
they never said it was drugs. There was no legal paper saying 
there was results. 
(Tr., p.18, Ls.1-10 (verbatim).) 
In addition to granting the parties' request for judicial notice of Heather 
Campbell's trial testimony, the court also granted Nunez's request to take 
"judicial notice" of the "19 page ISP report involving the investigation of the state 
lab on an unrelated matter," which Nunez attached to at least one of his 
pleadings. (Tr., p.18, Ls.11-22; see also p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.3.) The court, 
however, denied Nunez's request to take judicial notice of the other documents 
because they "are simply arguments made by [Nunez]" or were in the form of an 
affidavit, which are not admissible at an evidentiary hearing, but the court 
advised Nunez he could "testify about that" if he chose to do so. (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-
8.) The court then inquired of Nunez: 
Mr. Nunez, you need to help me understand what the basis 
of your motion is. What I'm hearing in reading these documents is 
this: You went to trial. Heather Campbell came in and testified at 
trial concerning the identification of drugs in question. Those drugs 
had been previously tested by Mr. Sincerbeaux. We know that the 
state lab came under investigation at some point for some claimed 
misconduct by somebody else because they were holding on to 
some drugs that they shouldn't have held on to. I mean, that's the 
essence of the report from the state police, but I can't see how that 
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constitutes a Brady violation in this case, how that constitutes any 
basis to believe that the drugs that Miss Campbell testified to 
weren't tested. 
I don't understand what your claim is. And if I can't 
understand what your claim is, then I can't make a decision as to 
whether you should be entitled to counsel to further pursue this 
matter, even if I decided it was appropriate to do that at this late 
time. So tell me in your own words what you think the State of 
Idaho did wrong in this case that would justify some post conviction 
relief here. 
(Tr., p.19, L.14-p.20, L.11.) 
Nunez answered: 
I believe that the man Mr. Sincerbeaux and the lady who 
came and testified, Mr. Sincerbeaux testified that he had did some 
testing on those drugs, but they never showed any kind of results. I 
believe that those drugs could have been contaminated by the time 
Mr. Sincerbeaux actually did complete some kind of analysis. 
There was no legal certificate presented saying these are the 
results of the same drugs that were tested. 
(Tr., p.20, Ls.12-20 (verbatim).) 
Following Nunez's explanation, the court asked standby counsel if she 
could provide any additional information regarding the merits of Nunez's claim. 
(Tr., p.20, Ls.21-24.) Standby counsel elaborated: 
Your Honor, in the Affidavit of Facts in Regards to Errors 
Surrounding the Testing by Idaho State Police Forensic Services, 
Mr. Nunez sets forth how the purported substance made their [sic] 
way through the testing system. And what seems to be part of the 
nucleus of his argument is that on page two, under Section (B), it 
lists his concerns that he just expressed about the possibility of 
contamination. And on page four of that same document, items 10 
and 11 talk about his concerns about the differences in the weight 
at the end of the process. 
So, it appears to me that he's raising questions about the 
validity of the testing from two points of view. One point before it 
actually entered into the testing process; and, secondly, that the --
his theory is that the numbers show a gap in the amounts and 
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because of those two issues he questions the validity of any 
testing. That's, I believe, where he is focusing his arguments. 
(Tr., p.20, L.25 - p.21, L.18.) 
Addressing Nunez, the court asked what he thought counsel "could 
accomplish" that Nunez had not already submitted. (Tr., p.21, Ls.19-22.) The 
court explained: 
[W]e have a record of what happened at trial. Obviously an 
attorney can't just manufacture evidence out of thin air. I 
understand that you are not trained in the law, but is there 
something out there that you think exists in the way of evidence 
that is not part of this file that I have in front of me now? 
(Tr., p.22, Ls.2-8.) Nunez provided the court with some documents related to his 
co-defendant, Thomas Perez, which were apparently provided to him in 
discovery, and standby counsel requested the court to take judicial notice of 
those documents as well. (Tr., p.22, Ls.9-3.) When the state objected, the court 
responded it was just "trying to ascertain whether [it] should appoint counsel." 
(Tr., p.23, Ls.8-12.) 
The court ultimately determined it would not modify the scope of counsel's 
representation for "two reasons." (Tr., p.25, Ls.20-22.) "Reason number one," 
which the court identified as "the least of the reasons," was that it was "a totally 
untimely filing." (Tr., p.25, Ls.22-24.) "The second reason," which the court 
characterized as "the more correct reason," was that a "reasonable person, 
spending their own money" would not "hire an attorney to pursue a post-
conviction claim like" the one alleged by Nunez. (Tr., p.26, Ls.13-25.) The court 
proceeded to ask Nunez whether he wished to present any evidence or make 
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any additional argument. (Tr., p.27, Ls.2-4, 6-9.) Nunez declined to do so. (Tr., 
p.27, Ls.5, 10-11.) The court then made the following findings: 
The court has taken judicial notice of certain aspects of the 
underlying criminal case. In particular, that consists of the trial 
testimony of Heather Campbell, who, at the time, was a forensic 
analyst employed by the state. I think her testimony is very clear, 
makes it very clear what has occurred in this case. 
This defendant, as well as another gentleman, were accused 
of bringing a significant quantity of methamphetamine into the State 
of Idaho. Both defendants went to trial. At Mr. Nunez's trial, Miss 
Campbell testified as the state's representative from the lab. Her 
testimony makes it very clear that this was the second time that the 
drugs had been tested in this case. Mr. Sincerbeaux, ... , had 
originally tested these drugs, and then due to the fact that he had 
moved up to the Coeur de 'Lane [sic] office, rather than bringing 
him down to trial the state elected to have Miss Campbell retest the 
drugs. She did that and at trial submitted what has been identified 
as State's Exhibit 10, the trial exhibit, showing the quantities of 
drugs that were tested and containing methamphetamine. 
So contrary to the petitioner's assertion here, there was, in 
fact, evidence at trial to this jury showing lab testing and the 
quantities that were involved here. That witness testified at trial, as 
I read the testimony, that there was nothing that would have 
constituted a contamination of this evidence. 
She testified as to the reason why there was a weight 
difference between what Mr. Sincerbeaux represented in his testing 
results and what she found in her testing results and that 
explanation was really two things. One, that some of the drugs 
were originally consumed in the first testing resulting in a miniscule 
difference in weight between the first test and the second test. The 
second explanation, which is part and parcel of the first, that any 
time you take drugs out of a bag and put it on a scale and through 
the testing process you're going to lose some negligible quantities 
just because residue is left on the testing instruments, neither of 
which is significant in this case because the quantity difference, as I 
said, was miniscule. We're talking well over, for each of these 
exhibits, 443 grams, 440 grams, 224 grams, 447 grams, 448 
grams, and that the measure difference was within, if I remember 
right, within a gram or even less. 
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The evidence that has been tendered in terms of this lab 
testing defugalty [sic] that occurred some time later and which is 
evidenced by the ... ISP investigation relates to this. There was 
an individual employed by the state lab who, in concert with some 
other people, instead of - well, basically left drugs sitting around 
the lab and that violated ISP's policies. She was either sanctioned 
as a result of that or dismissed. I'm not sure which. I doesn't really 
make any difference. She had no responsibility for the testing in 
this case in any event. There has been no showing made in any of 
the moving papers in this case that that activity in any way was 
related to the drug testing in this case, that it occurred at the same 
time or that it involved the same drugs in question. 
The real accusation that was made in this petition was a 
Brady violation. In other words, that the state had evidence that 
they withheld from the defendant and that that contributed to this 
conviction. Assuming for the sake of argument that the evidence 
represented by the 19 page ISP report constitutes some form of 
Brady evidence, first, it's clear that that evidence came about long 
after this came about so the state certainly couldn't have been put 
on notice of their obligation to disclose that. 
Second, to the extent that that might constitute Brady 
information, if it existed at the time, there is now showing of the 
proximity between that error on behalf of the state lab and the 
testing that occurred in this case. Simply stated, the fact that there 
may have been problems with the state lab in one regard as 
referenced in the ISP report does not demonstrate that there was 
some improprieties in this case. 
I have read and reread and reread the filings in this case to 
try and ascertain whether there is some basis for granting this 
defendant a new trial. I can find no basis to do that. The issue was 
put before the court and this jury as to the validity of the testing. 
The jury found him guilty of those charges .... 
I have granted the defendant the opportunity to present 
evidence at an evidentiary hearing that would flesh out this record. 
There is no additional evidence beyond what I have already stated 
here from the bench that would support ... post-conviction relief. 
Simply stated, Mr. Nunez, I find there is no merit to your 
petition. It is dismissed. 
(Tr., p.27, L.2 - p.31, L.23.) 
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The court entered judgment the following day, memorializing its denial of 
Nunez's request for counsel and dismissing his remaining claims. (R., p.312.) 
Fifty-one days later, on February 9, 2012, Nunez filed a "Notice of Reversible 
Fundamental Due Process Error, Objection and Remedy Sought," in which he 
contended he never received "notice of any decision rendered in [his] case." (R., 
pp.315-317.) Nunez's claim is corroborated by a notification of returned mail, 
field December 28, 2011. (R., p.314.) Consequently, the court entered an 
amended judgment on April 23, 2012. (R., p.334.) Nunez filed a timely notice of 
appeal from the amended judgment.5 (R., pp.352-356.) 
5 State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305, 246 P.3d 958 (2010) ("a party that does not 
timely appeal cannot complain of prejudice due to lack of notice that the 42-day 
window had begun unless both the clerk cannot prove it served the document 
and the party did not actually know that a final judgment had been entered"). 
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ISSUE 
Nunez states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Nunez's 
motion for appointment of counsel on the grounds that it was 
untimely? 
2. Did the court err by denying Mr. Nunez's motion for appointment 
of counsel without first giving him notice of why the Court found 
the petition to be frivolous and allowing him an opportunity to 
respond? 
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Nunez failed to show error in the denial of his motion asking the court 
to modify the scope of counsel's representation from limited assistance to full 
assistance, which request was made shortly before the evidentiary hearing and 
after repeatedly insisting that he wanted only limited participation by counsel who 
the court appointed early in the proceedings? 
17 
ARGUMENT 
Nunez Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Late Request To Modify 
The Scope Of Appointed Counsel's Representation From Limited Assistance To 
Full Assistance 
A. Introduction 
Although the district court appointed counsel to represent Nunez on his 
successive post-conviction petition, Nunez objected to the assistance beyond 
what he "expressly defined," and indicated he wanted to "control" the 
presentation of his case. (R., pp.65, 89.) The court acquiesced to Nunez's 
wishes and counsel was thereafter designated as "standby" counsel. (See R., 
p.100.) Nunez proceeded to file prose pleadings and even reminded the court of 
his desire to remain pro se as late as September 29, 2011. (R., pp.253-278, 
281-284, 297-304.) 
On November 9, 2011, Nunez attempted to "withdraw his pro se status," 
by stating as much at the end of his "Reply to State's 10/24/11 Responsive 
Pleading." (R., p.297.) However, he did not specifically notify standby counsel of 
his wishes as reflected by counsel's comments at the subsequent pretrial 
conference at which counsel indicated her understanding that Nunez wanted to 
represent himself. (Tr. p.5, Ls.17-19.) Ten days after the pretrial conference, 
and 18 days before the evidentiary hearing, Nunez formalized his request to 
"withdraw his prose status," by filing a motion requesting that counsel "formulate 
a proposed witness list, draft & submit subpeona's [sic], gather & submit relevant 
evidence," and "[p]ossibl[y] [conduct] cross-ex [sic] or rebuttal of Heather 
Campbell." (R., pp.308-310.) Because there was no hearing scheduled on the 
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motion, the court did not consider the request until the date scheduled for 
evidentiary hearing at which time it denied the motion after engaging in a detailed 
discussion with Nunez regarding his request and the nature of his claim. (See 
generally Tr., pp.11-22.) 
Nunez claims the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion, 
contending the court did not "reach its conclusion by an exercise of reason" and 
did not give him "advance notice" or a "meaningful opportunity to respond" to its 
determination that counsel was not warranted given the lack of merit to Nunez's 
post-conviction claim regarding the state lab. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-10.) 
Nunez's claims fail. The district court properly concluded that, under the 
circumstances, Nunez was not entitled to have the scope of counsel's 
representation modified from the limited assistance he initially requested and 
insisted upon to full assistance on the day of the evidentiary hearing. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel to 
represent a post-conviction petitioner pursuant to I.C. § 19-4904 is discretionary. 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. 
State, 147 Idaho 682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009). "In reviewing the 
denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, 
'[t]his Court will not set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous. As to questions of law, this Court exercises free review."' 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111 (quoting Brown v. State, 135 
Idaho 676,678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001)). 
19 
C. Nunez Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Request To Modify 
The Scope Of Appointed Counsel's Representation From Limited 
Assistance To Full Assistance 
Although Nunez frames his claim as the denial of the appointment of 
counsel, it is clear that the court appointed counsel in this case, but counsel's 
assistance was limited at Nunez's request. Thus, the question before the Court 
is not the traditional one of whether the court erred in denying a post-conviction 
petitioner's request for counsel but whether the court abused its discretion by 
denying a request to modify the scope of appointed counsel's representation. 
The district court denied Nunez's request to modify counsel's 
representation for two reasons: (1) the timing of the request, and (2) Nunez's 
claim did not merit counsel. (Tr., p.25, L.20 - p.26, L.25.) Nunez challenges 
both of these reasons, claiming the first reason was an abuse of discretion and 
the second reason was erroneous due to an alleged failure to provide sufficient 
notice and an opportunity to respond. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-10.) Both of 
Nunez's claims fail. 
As to the timing of his motion, Nunez appears to assert that the court 
abused its discretion in finding the request untimely because he "first renounced 
his right to proceed pro se and pleaded for the assistance of standby counsel" in 
a pleading filed "on November 9, forty days before the scheduled evidentiary 
hearing," which was followed by a "formal motion for appointment of counsel" 
filed "December 1, still 18 days before the hearing." (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) 
Thus, Nunez contends, standby counsel "could have been appointed and even 
been ready to present evidence by the scheduled hearing date" and even if "she 
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could not been ready [sic] in 18 days, she could have sought a continuance." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) This argument not only assumes the court had some 
obligation to act upon a "renounce[ment]" of Nunez's pro se status at the 
conclusion of a responsive pleading, a proposition for which Nunez offers no 
authority, but it also ignores the fact, noted by the district court, that Nunez failed 
to request a hearing on his December 1 motion to bring the matter to the court's 
attention. Moreover, Nunez cites no authority for the proposition that the court's 
finding that the motion "was untimely was clearly erroneous" simply because 
Nunez filed it a certain number of days in advance of the evidentiary hearing. 
From the court's perspective, and rightly so, Nunez's request to modify the scope 
of counsel's representation in his case was not before it for consideration until 
the date of the evidentiary hearing. Nunez has failed to show the court erred in 
deeming his motion as "untimely" under the circumstances. 
In addition to claiming the district court clearly erred in characterizing his 
request as untimely, Nunez also asserts the district court "did not reach its 
conclusion by an exercise of reason" because, he argues, "[t]here was no 
pressing reason to force [him] to proceed pro se on December 19" since "[n]o 
witnesses would be inconvenienced or put to expense" and because the court 
had already determined the proceeding would be bifurcated. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.8.) From this, Nunez contends, "It was unreasonable for the Court to conclude 
that such a minor gain in judicial efficiency outweighed Mr. Nunez's statutory 
right to counsel." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) However, the court's rationale 
regarding the timing of the motion was not based on judicial efficiency. Rather, 
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the court reasoned that Nunez's request was untimely given the "progress[ion]" 
of the case and Nunez's insistence that he proceed pro se, which he maintained 
up until a few weeks prior to the hearing. (Tr., p.25, L.22 - p.26, L.12.) Any 
claim that the district court denied Nunez's request in order to avoid any 
inconvenience to the court or potential witnesses is unsupported by the record 
and without merit. 
Nunez next takes issue with the court's statement that it "deem[ed] that 
[Nunez] ... waived the right to ask for full counsel in this case." (Tr., p.26, Ls.11-
12.) According to Nunez, such a determination is improper because: 
It may be that, at one point, assuming [he] was actually aware of 
the contents of the pleadings prepared by Mr. Priest, [5l he wanted to 
proceed with the assistance of his jail-house lawyer instead of 
trained counsel. However, once it became clear that the matter 
would not be resolved on the pleadings and was heading to an 
evidentiary hearing where Mr. Priest would not be present to assist 
him, Mr. Nunez realized he was out of his depth and knew he 
needed help. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) 
Nunez's implication, made for the first time on appeal, that he was 
unaware of the content of his pleadings, including his requests to proceed with 
only the limited assistance of counsel, is contradicted by the record. Nunez 
verified his successive petition, attesting that had read the pleading in its entirety. 
(R., p.35.) Nunez also verified his other pro se pleadings and signed other 
notarized affidavits and pleadings. (R., pp.130, 212, 247, 268, 278, 283-284, 
304.) At no time did Nunez advise the court that his requested limitations on 
6 Nunez's successive petition indicates it was prepared, at his request, by 
"inmate Steven Paul Priest." (R., p.13; see also R., p.47.) 
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counsel's involvement were not knowing, voluntary and intelligent. In fact, when 
the court inquired as to why the scope of counsel's representation should be 
changed on the date of the evidentiary hearing, Nunez's response was not that 
he did not understand his prior requests to proceed pro se, but that he chose to 
"defend[] [himself] because [he] wasn't able to communicate with [counsel]" (Tr., 
p.12, Ls.15-16), an allegation which was itself contradicted by one of Nunez's 
affidavits (R., p.209 (affidavit stating that "[a]s a result of phone communications 
held with [standby counsel] on WE 09-29-11, I have marshaled these facts and 
admissible evidence"). 
Nor does the record support Nunez's appellate assertion that his request 
for the full assistance of counsel was made upon the realization that "the matter 
would not be resolved on the pleadings and was heading to an evidentiary 
hearing where Mr. Priest would not be present to assist him." (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.8-9.) The court's original order scheduling the evidentiary hearing for 
December 19, 2011, was entered on August 3, 2011, the same date the court 
appointed the public defender to represent Nunez. (R., pp.65-66.) Nunez's 
objection to the full assistance of counsel and his pleadings reiterating his desire 
to proceed pro se occurred after the hearing was first scheduled. (R., pp.83-90, 
130, 212.) Thus, Nunez's request to proceed pro se was made knowing the 
court had scheduled an evidentiary hearing.7 While it is true that the court, a few 
7 Nunez's only citation to the record in support of his appellate claim that he 
requested counsel "once it became clear that the matter ... was heading to an 
evidentiary hearing," is a statement contained in the "Notice of Continued Brady 
Error, in the Cumulative & Within the Prosecution's Supplemental Response to 
Request for Discovery. Affidavit of Fact [sic] in Support." (Appellant's Brief, p.9 
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weeks after scheduling the hearing, entered a notice of intent to dismiss Nunez's 
claims, including his claim regarding the state lab, and Nunez sought to 
"withdraw his pro se status" in the reply brief filed shortly after the court entered 
an order stating it would allow his state lab claim to proceed, Nunez cannot 
seriously contend that his request to proceed pro se was not made knowing the 
court scheduled an evidentiary hearing. 
This Court should also reject Nunez's request to engage in supposition 
about whether he "could have reasonably be~ieved that [standby counsel] would 
be ready to proceed on December 19, given his earlier requests for her 
assistance." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) This possibility is unsupported by the 
record and is also irrelevant to the district court's determination that Nunez's 
request for the full assistance of counsel was untimely. Further, Nunez has failed 
to explain why standby counsel was obligated to search through his pro se 
"Reply to State's 10/24/11 Responsive Pleading," filed November 9, and discover 
that he wanted to "withdraw his pro se status." (R., p.303.) At some point, the 
burden must be on the petitioner, who orchestrated the circumstances in which 
(citing R., p.283).) Toward the conclusion of that affidavit, Nunez wrote: "I'm a 
very humble man. The fantastic thoughts of pulling into your Court and single-
handedly crossing pens with the Great State of Idaho, appears more than a little 
fantastic." (R., p.283 (capitalization original).) The next paragraph reads: "So, I 
respectfully ask this Court, please consider and grant I.R.C.P. Rule 56(a), relief 
on behalf of the claimant at this time. Save yourself the time and effort of a 
hearing, and accept this, my deep & full respect to this Honorable Court.". (R., 
p.283 (verbatim).) Nothing about Nunez's characterization of himself as a 
"humble man" supports his appellate claim that he asked for counsel "once it 
became clear that the matter ... was heading to an evidentiary hearing where 
Mr. Priest" could not assist him. This is particularly true when the statement is 
read in context, which notably does not contain a request for the full assistance 
of counsel. 
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he finds himself, to take the appropriate action to change those circumstances if 
that is what he desires. Kootenai County v. Harriman-Sayler, 293 P.3d 637, 641 
(2012) ("Pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those 
represented by an attorney.") (citations and quotations omitted). Including a 
stated desire to change his "pro se status" in a responsive pleading is insufficient 
for that purpose. 
While Nunez undoubtedly later took the initiative to file an actual motion, 
he did not request a hearing on that motion and he has cited no legal standard 
that required standby counsel to do so. If Nunez wanted counsel to be prepared 
to provide full assistance at the evidentiary hearing, it would have behooved him 
to call counsel and request as much. Regardless, Nunez failed to present his 
request to the court in a timely fashion, and the court did not err in concluding as 
much. 
Even if the district court's determination that the motion was untimely was 
an abuse of discretion, that was only one of two reasons for the denial and was 
"the least of the reasons." (Tr., p.25, Ls.22-24.) The other reason related to the 
merits of Nunez's claim. (Tr., p.26, Ls.13-25.) Nunez contends this reason was 
also improper because the court "did not give advance notice to [him] or a 
meaningful opportunity to respond." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Nunez argues the 
court had such an obligation pursuant to Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 23 P .3d 
138 (2001). (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Nunez is, again, incorrect. 
In Brown, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed whether a post-conviction 
petitioner would be entitled to counsel under the standards set forth in I.C. § 19-
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852, which entitled a petitioner to counsel unless the court determined the post-
conviction proceeding was "frivolous." 135 Idaho at 678-679, 23 P.3d at 140-
141. The Court explained that a proceeding is "frivolous if it is not a proceeding 
that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his 
own expense." kl at 679, 23 P.3d at 141 (quotations omitted). In making this 
determination, the Court cautioned: 
When applying that standard to pro se applications for appointment 
of counsel, the trial court should keep in mind that petitions and 
affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and 
incomplete. Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be 
alleged because they do not exist, they also may not be alleged 
because the pro se petitioner simply does not know what are the 
essential elements of a claim. 
Brown, 135 ldahoat679, 23 P.3d at 141. 
The Court provided further guidance to district courts considering requests 
for counsel in post-conviction cases: 
It is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of 
the claimed defects so he has an opportunity to respond and to 
give the trial court an adequate basis for deciding the need for 
counsel based upon the merits of the claims. If the court decides 
that the claims in the petition are frivolous, the court should provide 
sufficient information regarding the basis for its ruling to enable the 
petitioner to supplement the request with the necessary additional 
facts, if they exist. Although the petitioner is not entitled to have 
counsel appointed in order to search the record for possible 
nonfrivolous claims, he should be provided with a meaningful 
opportunity to supplement the record and to renew his request for 
court-appointed counsel prior to the dismissal of his petition where, 
as here, he has alleged facts supporting some elements of a valid 
claim. 
Brown, 135 Idaho at 679, 23 P.3d at 141. 
Although the Court has since recognized that I.C. § 19-852 no longer 
applies to requests for counsel in post-conviction cases as a result of legislative 
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amendment, it has instructed trial courts to "keep in mind the admonition set forth 
in Brown about the typical problems with pro se pleadings." Charboneau v. 
State, 140 Idaho 789, 792-93, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111-1112 (2004). With that 
admonition in mind, the Court in Charboneau instructed: 
[l]n giving notice of intent to deny the Petition, the court should 
provide sufficient information regarding the basis for its ruling to 
enable the petitioner to supplement the request with necessary 
additional facts, if they exist. If he alleges facts to raise the 
possibility of a valid claim, the district court should appoint counsel 
in order to give the petitioner an opportunity with counsel to 
properly allege the necessary supporting facts. 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112 (citation and quotations 
omitted). 
The court in this case followed the Court's admonition from the outset and 
appointed counsel to represent Nunez and it was Nunez who limited counsel's 
ability to aid him in his pursuit of post-conviction relief. Thus, Nunez is effectively 
asking this Court to extend the notice and opportunity to respond requirement 
from the initial determination of whether counsel should be appointed at all to a 
subsequent decision on whether to grant a petitioner's request to modify the 
scope of counsel's representation from limited assistance to full assistance. 
Nunez has cited no authority that would compel the extension of those 
requirements to such a circumstance, nor has he provided any argument as to 
why the Court should do so. The Court should, therefore, decline to consider 
Nunez's claim. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) 
("When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or 
argument, they will not be considered."). Even if the Court concludes such an 
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extension is appropriate, Nunez has failed to show he did not receive adequate 
notice or an opportunity to respond to the court's evaluation of the merits of his 
claim as it related to his request to change the scope of counsel's representation. 
In its Notice and Second Notice, the latter of which was filed three months 
prior to the evidentiary hearing, the court forewarned Nunez that he would be 
required to show that "the lab's testing in his case was inaccurate." (R., p.79 
(emphasis original).) Nunez had three months to gather evidence to address that 
requirement but failed to do so because, as ultimately explained by the district 
court, the improprieties outlined in the ISP report upon which Nunez's claim was 
premised were unrelated to the testing in Nunez's case. (Tr., p.27, L.5 - p.31, 
L.23.) Nunez cannot legitimately complain that he was unprepared to respond to 
the court's inquiry regarding the merits of his claim at the time set for his 
evidentiary hearing. Nunez not only had the chance to respond through his 
various pleadings filed in advance of the hearing, the court afforded him, and 
standby counsel, the opportunity to do so before denying his request to modify 
the scope of counsel's representation. (See generally Tr., pp.13-22.) 
Nunez fails to identify what was insufficient about the court's notice or his 
opportunity to respond, but contends, in conclusory fashion, that it was 
inadequate. (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Neither the record nor the law support 
Nunez's claim. What the record does show is that the district court went to great 
lengths to facilitate Nunez's desire to proceed pro se and aid him in presenting 
evidence to support his claim. (See, ~. R., p.79 (notifying Nunez of the 
requirement that he prove the lab testing in his case was inaccurate; pp.197-198 
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(court order requiring the state to provide Nunez with discovery and ordering the 
state to deliver the documents directly to Nunez in addition to standby counsel); 
Tr. pp.12-22 (lengthy colloquy between the court, Nunez, and standby counsel in 
an effort to ferret out whether there was any evidence that Nunez could present 
to support his claims).) 
Nunez has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his request to modify the scope of counsel's representation from limited 
assistance to full assistance. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment 
dismissing Nunez's successive post-conviction petition. 
DATED this 8th day of March, 2013. 
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